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Yarbrough v. Commonwealth
519 S.E.2d 602 (Va. 1999)
L Facts
Robert Stacey Yarbrough (Yarbrough") was convicted of the capital
murder of Cyril Hugh Hamby ("Hamby") and sentenced to death upon a
jury finding of the vileness aggravator. On May 8, 1997, Yarbrough and
Dominic Jackson Rainey ("Rainey") went to Hamby's Store on Route 1 in
Mecklenberg County, with the intention of robbing the store. Upon
entering the store, Rainey locked the front door and Yarbrough confronted
the proprietor, Hamby, with a shotgun. Yarbrough retrieved an electrical
cord and string from the living quarters behind the store and bound
Hamby's arms and legs, placing him on the floor in one of the aisles of the
store. Yarbrough repeatedly asked Hamby where he kept guns hidden in
the store, kicking Hamby in the head and left arm between inquiries.
Yarbrough also removed cash from the register, cut Hamby several times on
his neck with a knife and took Hamby's wallet. Both Yarbrough and
Rainey took cigarettes, beer, and wine and then left the store through the
back door. While none of the cuts to Hamby's neck severed major arteries,
Hamby bled to death as a result of the wounds
At trial, Rainey testified against Yarbrough. In addition, the
Commonwealth presented as evidence the murder weapon, Yarbrough 's
bloody sneakers and clothing, footprints from the store which matched
Yarbrough's sneakers, and DNA evidence linking Yarbrough to the scene
of the crime and the murder weapon. The jury found Yarbrough guilty of
capital murder. The Commonwealth sought the death penalty based on the
vileness aggravating factor only. Before the commencement of the penalty
phase, Yarbrough proffered a jury instruction that life imprisonment meant
life without parole; he asserted that such an instruction would prevent jury
confusion and was a matter of fundamental fairness. Citing Simmons v.
South Carolina' and Supreme Court of Virginia precedent, the court denied
Yarbrough's request; it reasoned that such an instruction was required only
when the Commonwealth was trying to prove future dangerousness as an
aggravating factor. Yarbrough again sought such an instruction after the
Commonwealth's closing argument and the trial court again refused to give
the instruction. After a period of deliberation, the jury sent a question to
1. Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602, 603-07 (Va. 1999).
2. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
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the court regarding the meaning of life in prison. Yarbrough again re-
quested that the court define life imprisonment as imprisonment without
possibility of parole. The trial court recalled the jury and refused to answer
their question, telling them "not [to] concern [themselves] with what might
happen afterwards."3
After further deliberation, the jury sentenced Yarbrough to death.
During Yarbrough's sentencing hearing, defense counsel urged the court to
consider the jury's reluctance during its deliberations and the court's own
knowledge regarding Yarbrough's ineligibility for parole. The trial court
imposed the jury's verdict and sentence without comment.4
On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Yarbrough's major
arguments consisted of the following: (1) the trial court erroneously ap-
pointed a special assistant prosecutor from another jurisdiction to assist the
Commonwealth's Attorney from Mecklenberg County; (2) evidence pre-
sented by the Commonwealth and relied upon by the jury lacked both
credibility and sufficiency to support a capital murder conviction; and (3)
the trial court erred in failing to provide the jury with an instruction regard-
ing the meaning of life imprisonment as life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole, either upon the defendant's request or when the jury
sought clarification on this point.'
II. Holding
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Yarbrough's capital murder
conviction, vacated the death sentence, and remanded the case for a new
sentencing phase.6 The court held that "in the context of a capital murder
trial a jury's knowledge of the lack of availability of parole is necessary" to
prevent a harsher sentence recommendation by the jury than would have
normally been given had the jury known the end result of its decision.7
This holding ensures that upon conviction of capital murder, a defendant's
request for an instruction defining life imprisonment, either prior to submit-
ting the issue of penalty to the jury or following an inquiry from the jury
during deliberation, will be granted.8
3. Yarbrough, 519 S.E.2d at 604-07, 610.
4. Id. at 607.
5. Id. at 608-11.
6. Id. at 617.
7. Id. at 616.
8. Id. at 615.
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II. Analysis/Application in Virginia'
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled on two issues presented in this
appeal as matters of first impression."0
A. -Life Means Life-Instruction
After his capital murder conviction, Yarbrough proffered a jury in-
struction which would inform the jury that "'imprisonment for life' means
imprisonment for life without possibility of parole."'1 The trial court
refused the instruction, citing current Virginia law as argued by the Com-
monwealth-namely, that the instruction is improper when "the Common-
wealth relies only on the vileness factor."12 Yarbrough repeated his request
for a "life means life" instruction two more times during the penalty phase
of the trial: once after the Commonwealth's closing argument and a second
time during deliberations, when the jury asked the trial court for a defini-
tion of "life in prison." 3 The trial court refused to offer the instruction or
answer the question posed by the jury.".
On appeal, Yarbrough argued that Simmons v. South Carolina created
a due process right for a capital defendant that his "jury be fully informed
as to what the realities of a sentence are."" Yarbrough asked that the
holding of Simmons be extended in Virginia to all capital cases, not just
those in which the Commonwealth relies on the aggravating factor of future
dangerousness to prove death eligibility.16 The Commonwealth contended
that the Supreme Court of Virginia had already limited the application of
Simmons to capital cases where future dangerousness is at issue because only
9. Yarbrough raised"various challenges to the constitutionality of the Virginia capital
murder statute and the statutory scheme under which capital murder trials are conducted and
death sentences are reviewed on appeal." Id. at 607. The Supreme Court of Virginia sum-
marily dismissed these claims, stating that it had previously addressed and rejected them. Id.
These claims will not be discussed here.
10. Id. at 608, 612.
11. Id. at 606.
12. Id. Until Yarbrougb, no Virginia capital murder defendant accused of only the
vileness aggravating factor had been sentenced to death. In 1994, the United States Supreme
Court held that when a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, he is "entitled to
inform the jury of his parole ineligibility." Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 171
(1994). After Virginia abolished parole in 1995 for convicted felons, see VA. CODE ANN. S
53.1-165.1 (Michie 1999), convicted capital murder defendants were entitled to a "life means
life" instruction only if the Commonwealth relied on future dangerousness as an aggravating
factor.
13. Yarbrougb, 519 S.E.2d at 607.
14. Id.
15. Yarbrougb, 519 S.E.2d at 612 (citation omitted in original).
16. Id. at 612.
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in these cases would a defendant's parole eligibility prejudice the jury should
the jury find the defendant a continuing threat to society."7
Ruling on the issue of availability of a "life means life" instruction
(when the Commonwealth asserts only vileness as an aggravating factor) as
a matter of first impression, 8 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
Simmons had no application, the arguments presented by Yarbrough and
the Commonwealth were without merit, prior Virginia case law applied,
and Yarbrough deserved the instruction. 9 The Supreme Court of Virginia
held Simmons inapplicable because Yarbrough was challenging a death
sentence imposed solely on the aggravating factor of vileness, whereas in
Simmons, the defendant was sentenced to death based on the aggravating
factor of future dangerousness.2" The Supreme Court of Virginia then
turned to a line of Virginia cases ruling on the provision of information to
juries during sentencing.2'
Citing Hinton v. Commonwealth,22 Jones v. Commonwealth,23 and
Coward v. Commonwealth,24 the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that
instructions to the jury regarding parole eligibility, executive pardon, or
executive clemency constituted error where such information "could lead
a jury to impose a harsher sentence than it otherwise might."" In each of these
cases, the trial court had given instructions explaining or alluding to the
defendant's eligibility for parole or post-sentencing executive branch control
over the number of years the defendant would remain in prison.26 The
Supreme Court of Virginia synthesized the policy underlying this line of
cases:
[T]he jury should not be permitted to speculate on the potential effect
of parole, pardon, or an act of clemency on its sentence because doing so
17. Id.
18. Id. at 612. Before Yarbrough, no capital defendant who was ineligible for parole had
been sentenced to death exclusively on a finding of the aggravating factor of vileness. Since
1995, when the abolition of parole for felons convicted of capital murder was legislatively
instituted, all Virginia capital defendants receiving the death penalty have been sentenced to
death after either a finding of future dangerousness and vileness or of future dangerousness
alone. Id. at 611-12. See also VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Michie 1999).
19. Yarbrough, 519 S.E.2d at 612-16.
20. Id. at 612.
21. Id. at 613.
22. 247 S.E.2d 704 (Va. 1978) (describing to the jury the manner in which defendant
might receive early release was reversible error on the part of the trial court).
23. 72 S.E.2d 693 (Va. 1952) (informing jury that the executive branch would control
the defendant's ability to "get out" of prison if they imposed a life sentence instead of death
was improper).
24. 178 S.E. 797 (Va. 1935) (informing jury of "good behavior" sentence reduction
improper).
25. Yarbrough, 519 S.E.2d at 613 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 614-15.
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would inevitably prejudice the jury in favor of a harsher sentence than
the facts of the case might otherwise warrant.
27
The Supreme Court of Virginia continued its analysis by stating that this
rule has been applied to capital cases "where the defendant would have been
eligible for parole" (cases prior to 1995) by the exclusion of any instruction
regarding such eligibility. 8
Section 53.1-165.1 of the Virginia Code eliminates parole eligibility for
a convicted capital murderer.2 9 Therefore, a jury sentencing a capital defen-
dant has only two sentences to choose from: death or life imprisonment
without possibility for parole.3 When applying the policy developed in
Coward and its progeny, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that to
eliminate erroneous speculation by the sentencing jury in a post-1995 capital
murder sentencing, "the absence of such procedures or policies [for example,
parole eligibility and executive action] favoring the defendant" should "be
disclosed to the jury."3 In support of this proposition the court cited the
scenario played out during the sentencing phase of Yarbrough's trial where
the jury returned to the court during deliberations to inquire about
Yarbrough's parole eligibility. The Yarbrough jury in fact suggested a
hypothetical where Yarbrough would serve only twelve years if sentenced
to life imprisonment.32 In direct contravention of the policy in Coward, the
trial court permitted the sentencing jury to speculate on the effect of parole
on any sentence it might impose.33 The Supreme Court of Virginia stated
that:
[A] jury fully informed on [parole ineligibility] in this context [where
the jury has a choice between death or life imprisonment without the
eligibility of parole] is consistent with a fair trial both for the defendant
and the Commonwealth.3'
The Court then held that:
[I]n the penalty-determination phase of a trial where the defendant has
been convicted of capital murder, in response to a proffer of a proper
instruction from the defendant prior to submitting the issue of penaty-
determination to the jury or where the defendant asksfor such instruction
following an inquiry from the jury during deliberations, the trial court
27. Id. at 615.
28. Id.
29. VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Michie 1999).
30. Yarbrougb, 519 S.E.2d at 615.
31. Id.





shall instruct the jury that the words "imprisonment for life" mean
"imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole.""
Therefore, a defendant convicted of capital murder who makes a timely
request for such instruction or clarification, is entitled to a jury instruction
or clarification that life imprisonment means le without the possibility of
parole.
The dissent in Yarbrough argued that the majority only concerned itself
with 'the fairness considerations of the defendant, and not those of "the
Commonwealth and her citizens."- The latter "fairness considerations," the
dissent argued, should lead to a jury instruction regarding executive
clemency. In Dingus v. Commonwealth,'8 the Commonwealth's Attorney
had pleaded with the jury to impose death because clemency might shorten
a life sentence.39 The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia' held that
"such a reflection upon the executive department as a reason for imposing
the death penalty could not be justified and should not under any
circumstances be tolerated."4" Moreover, if the Commonwealth should be
permitted to argue clemency, the defense should then be permitted to
respond by informing the jury about the rarity and types of clemency in
capital cases.
The holding in Yarbrough provides capital defendants with a safeguard
against jury imposition of a harsher sentence, based on factors external to
the defendant's particular case, than the jury would normally impose. Even
though the cases cited by the majority prevented a jury from receiving an
instruction regarding parole, while in Yarbrough the court ruled that the
jury should receive such instruction, the underlying reasoning, prevention
of a harsher sentence than would normally have been imposed, is identical
in the two scenarios."2 The dissent failed to recognize this underlying theme
and instead seized on the disparate circumstantial facts between the cited
cases and Yarbrough.
Finally, it should be noted that the decision to permit a "life means life"
instruction 'in Virginia capital cases is strictly based on state law. In
California v. Ramos," the United States Supreme Court held that "the
wisdom.., to permit juror consideration of [post-sentencing events] is best
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 617-18.
37. Id. at 618.
38. 149 S.E. 414 (Va. 1929).
39. Dingus v. Commonwealth, 149 S.E. 414, 415 (Va. 1929).
40. Now known as the Supreme Court of Virginia.
41. Dingus, 149 S.E. at 415.
42. Yarbrough, 519 S.E.2d at 615.
43. 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
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left to the States."" The decision in Yarbrougb is not based on the United
States Constitution.
B. Appointment of Special Assistant Prosecutor
Yarbrough argued on appeal that the trial court erred in appointing an
assistant Commonwealth's Attorney from another jurisdiction as a special
assistant prosecutor. 5 The special assistant prosecutor was originally
appointed via an ex parte order based on section 19.2-155 of the Virginia
Code. 6  Yarbrough correctly argued that the appointment was
inappropriate because that statute allows appointment only when the
original prosecutor is unable to perform his duties."'
The trial court vacated the original order and appointed the special
assistant prosecutor pursuant to a renewed motion by the Commonwealth
after a hearing at which both parties had opportunity to be heard."' The
trial court relied on its "inherent authority to administer cases on its docket"
in granting the motion." Yarbrough contended that this second
appointment, based on the courts inherent authority, constituted error
because the special assistant prosecutor was not from the jurisdiction where
the crime had occurred.'
* The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled on this issue as a matter of first
impression." The court ruled that a trial court has broad discretion "in
permitting the Commonwealth to obtain... assistance" when seeking help
rom a more experienced Commonwealth's Attorney whose services wl
not cost additional tax dollars." As a result, the Commonwealth now has
the ability to assemble a "dream team" to prosecute capital cases as long as
the trial court approves the proffered appointments. Defense counsel shou-
ld respond to such appointment motions with their own request for
additional resources and time to prepare for trial. Defense counsel should
argue that they are entitled to these additional resources in order to contest
effectively the expertise and increased resources made available to the
Commonwealth by this mechanism.
44. Yarbrougb, 519 S.E.2d at 612 (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
45. Id. at 608.
46. Id. See also VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-155 (Michie 1999).
47. Yarbrougb, 519 S.E.2d at 608.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 609.
51. Id. at 608.
52. Id. at 609.
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C. Credibility and Sufficiency of Evidence of Capital Murder
On appeal, Yarbrough argued that the testimony of his accomplice,
Rainey, lacked sufficient reliability to support the Commonwealth's
assertion that Hamby died at the hands of Yarbrough." Rainey was the
only eye witness to the murder and was therefore the Commonwealth's
chief witness.' Yarbrough argued that because Rainey's testimony was self-
serving, in that by testifying that Yarbrough was the "triggerman" Rainey
evaded a death sentence, it lacked sufficient reliability to support a finding
that Yarbrough was the killer."5 Yarbrough also contended that the forensic
evidence proved only that Yarbrough was present when Hamby died.s'
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the reliability and sufficiency
of Rainey's testimony was a matter of fact to be determined by the trier of
fact during the defendant's trial."7 A jury's reliance on a specific witness's
testimony or evidence provided by one of the parties to the case "will not
be overturned on appeal unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it."8 Citing Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 9 the court stated that an
accomplice's testimony is not inherently incredible when it is supported by
forensic evidence.' Therefore, the court concluded that the evidence
presented by the Commonwealth was a sufficient basis for the jury's
decision that Hamby died at the hand of Yarbrough.'
In addition, Yarbrough argued that the Commonwealth failed to prove
that Hamby's death supported a finding of vileness, the aggravating factor
on which Yarbrough's death sentence was based.' Specifically, Yarbrough
argued that the Commonwealth failed to establish that Hamby was
conscious at the time of the murder (leading to an argument that the murder
involved torture), or that any of the individual wounds would have lead to
Hamby's death (leading to a conclusion that none of the acts of wounding
Hamby were excessive, thereby disproving the aggravated battery which
indicated vileness).' 3 The Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed Yarbrough's
first argument, that Hamby may have been unconscious, by relying on
Rainey's testimony that Hamby pleaded for his life. The court dealt with
the second argument by relying on precedent which allows for an expansion
53. Id.
54. Id. at 605.
55. Id. at 609.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 610.
58. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. S 8.01-680 (Michie 1999)).
59. 450 S.E.2d 146 (Va. 1994).
60. Yarbrough, 519 S.E.2d at 610.





of the time frame and acts which may constitute aggravated battery.' The
court held that any acts that facilitate the murder or occur during the
commission of a predicate felony are to be considered in the determination
of aggravated battery.6 Therefore, the restraining and kicking of Hamby
during the commission of the robbery and the murder were acts that the
jury could properly take into consideration when determining that an
aggravated battery occurred.66 Therefore, evidence existed on which the
jury could rely in its finding of vileness.67
D. Conclusion
Yarbrough provides capital defendants with the right to have the jury
instructed that "life means life." It is important to note two things about
this significant ruling. First, the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision is
based entirely on state law, and is therefore susceptible to legislative action.'
Second, the defendant has a right to a "life means life" instruction, but the
defendant must timely request the instruction. Having said this, the ruling
is an important step in Virginia capital case law, one that provides Virginia
defendants with increased fairness when facing the ultimate societal penalty.
Matthew K. Mahoney




68. It is unclear whether the decision in Yarbrough has any basis in the Virginia
Constitution. If the Virginia Constitution provides a capital defendant with such fairness
considerations found in the Yarbrough decision, the holding cannot be legislatively
overturned.
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